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MINERAL RIGHTS
Frederick W. Ellis*
JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal in Superior Oil Co. v. Cox,1 holding that lease
acreage earned under a separate agreement by a unit
operator by reason of unit drilling did not benefit the unit
operator's joint venturers. The case turned on interpretation2
of a joint operating agreement's acreage contribution clause.
The third circuit had ruled that the other joint venturers
were entitled to share in the earned acreage received by Cox
as a result of his drilling the unit well. The third circuit result
suggested a possible tendency to favor those who had participated in the costs of the venture, 3 because the economic result of the court of appeal decision was to apportion the benefits of the drilling venture consistently with the burden of
costs. The supreme court decision incorrectly reaches an opposite result.
The third circuit's view does require a liberal reading of
the acreage contribution clause, for Cox did not involve the
ordinary acreage acquisition situation contemplated by a contribution clause. However, viewing the totality of the legal
relations of the parties and the facts of the case, justice and
correct legal analysis would have been better served had the
Louisiana Supreme Court given greater weight to several
important circumstances. The case involved a joint venture
and the operator-defendant was an agent of his joint venturers, who had shared his costs and risks.
Clauses designed to effect economic fair play ought to be
liberally construed. The unfairness of the result in Cox stems
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 307 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975), reversing 290 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974).
2. "Acreage or Cash Contributions: If any party receives, while this
agreement is in force, a contribution of cash toward the drilling of a well or
any other operation on the subject leases such contribution shall be paid to
the party or parties who conducted the drilling or other operation and same
shall be applied against the cost of drilling or other operation." 307 So. 2d at
353.
3. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Mineral Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 345 (1976).
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from the fact that the operator was allowed to use drilling
costs and risks that were shared with his joint venturers to
obtain economic benefits (securing rights to acreage) that
were not shared with his joint venturers. Preoccupation with
definitional detail of the meaning of acreage clause verbiage,
a focus on the chronological significance of the condition the
unit drilling satisfied, and the intricacy of the facts apparently all served to obfuscate the simple truth that it is unreasonable to assume that parties undertaking joint risks and
costs do not intend joint benefits.
UNIT WELL COSTS
In denying a writ application in Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil
Co., 4 a scant majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed
with the third circuit's 5 denying recovery to a unit operator
for costs prior to unitization, on the basis of the facts found
below. In concurring in the writ denial, Justice Tate noted
that he would ground the denial on a fiduciary relationship's
having been violated as a consequence of drainage by a mineral lessee of his lessor's lands not covered by the lease.
Inexco, Desormeaux's lessee, had completed the Desormeaux No. 1 well on land covered by the Desormeaux mineral
lease on September 20, 1970. Desormeaux also owned adjoining unleased acreage. On August 5, 1971, purportedly effective June 30, 1971, the Commissioner of Conservation established a unit including a portion of the unleased land. By this
time, Inexco had already enjoyed production in excess of well
costs. The trial court rejected the argument that the Commissioner's method of apportioning costs was not controlling.
This view was shared by the third circuit, which had earlier
held that the Commissioner's fact finding powers as to unit
well costs under Louisiana R.S. 30:106 related to cost determination, not apportionment. It treated apportionment as a
legal problem. 7 Exercising its judicial discretion, the court of
4. 302 So. 2d 37 (La. 1975).
5. 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
6. LA. R.S. 30:10 (1950): "In the event pooling is required, the cost of
development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable by the operator to
other interested owners shall be limited to the actual reasonable expenditures required for that purpose, including a charge for supervision. In the
event of a dispute relative to these costs, the commissioner shall determine
the proper costs, after notice to all interested persons and a hearing."
7. 298 So. 2d at 900-01, citing the remand at 277 So. 2d 218, 220 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973).
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appeal approved the district court's holding that "the cost of
the well prior to unitization could not be charged to the landowner since these costs had been recovered from the production prior to unitization." The court reasoned that the
operators of the well would otherwise be recovering twice. It
incorrectly treated Louisiana R.S. 30:10, which permits
charges to "other interested owners" in a unit, as inapplicable because it pertains to "separately owned tracts."9
The courts' misunderstanding of economics and accounting principles has led to an erroneous view of the law. A
capital cost is not expensed upon acquiring the capital item;
rather, the cost should be apportioned over the productive life
of the capital asset. This principle underlies the theory of
depreciation expense accounting. True economic justice, the
objective of Louisiana R.S. 30:10, would have been done if
drilling costs of the unit well had been apportioned over the
anticipated life of the well, with appropriate interest adjustments. Thus, the landowner's unleased acreage would not
have enjoyed an unfair "free ride," and yet due weight would
have been given to the pre-unitization use of the capital asset
on a non-unitized basis.
The fact that the free rider was a landowner who coincidentally was the lessor of the unit operator does not detract
from the correctness of this analysis. Clearly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal erred in seizing upon the statutory language "separately owned tracts," maintaining that there was
no separate ownership because of the fact that Desormeaux
owned both the leased and unleased land in the unit. The
court of appeal erroneously ascribed the common understanding of "owned" or "owner" to Louisiana R.S. 30:10's uncommon use of those terms. The Conservation Act contains a
special definition of "owner." Louisiana R.S. 30:3(8) defines
"'owner" as the person who has the right to drill into and
produce from a pool and to appropriate the production either
for himself or others. Mr. Desormeaux had this right on his
unleased acreage; his lessee had the right on the leased acreage. The leased and unleased parts of the Desormeaux land
in the unit were therefore "separately owned tracts" within
the Conservation Act's special definition of ownership.
As to Justice Tate's concurring opinion in the writ denial,
8. 298 So. 2d at 901.
9. Id.
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the distinguished jurist accurately sensed that drainage
equities could affect the issue before the court, since the
lessor of the unit operator was also the owner of the unleased
acreage. However, unaided by the argument and briefing
available on a full hearing of a case, the concurring opinion
overkilled the issue. To extend the implied obligations of a
lessee to prevent drainage to lands not covered by the lease is
at least stretching that obligation. To then style the alleged
breach of the lessee's obligations as a breach of a "fiduciary
obligation" is to compound that error. Article 122 of the Mineral Code codifies the long-established standard that the lessee's duty is that of a reasonably prudent operator, to act in
good faith with due regard for the interests of both the lessee
and the lessor. His duty is less stringent than that of a
fiduciary. Therefore, Louisiana R.S. 31:122 explicitly states,
"A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his
lessor . ... "
If the position taken by the concurring opinion were accepted, no mineral lessee could safely develop leased property
adjoined by unleased acreage of the lessor. Paradoxically,
compliance with his duty to develop would automatically put
the lessee in violation of his duty to prevent drainage. The
only way he could avoid this problem would be to unitize
before drilling, which is not a requirement of a mineral lease
and could be poor conservation practice. Prior to drilling,
geological information is untested and unit equity is a mere
guessing game.
Perhaps the errors in Desormeaux resulted from excessive concern about "sticking" a landowner for well costs and a
lack of concern with the need to protect an operator in the
face of a quick payout. Well costs normally are borne by an oil
company and not landowners. However, when the well was
obviously rich, with payout in less than a year, and when
doubtlessly the landowner would have had no trouble obtaining a lessee, the landowner must have preferred being "in the
business" for 8/8ths rather than a mere fractional royalty;
that being so, he should also be "in the business" for 8/8ths of
the cost as to the unleased tract and should be afforded no
special treatment. That is the law under Louisiana R.S. 30:10.
Perhaps if the court had granted and received the benefit of
full argument, the 4-3 writ denial decision would have been
different, as it should be in the next case.
Justice Tate correctly sensed that drainage considera-
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tions can affect the problem. Truly, the obligation to offset
and prevent drainage to the leased premises should not appertain to the prevention of drainage on non-leased acreage.
Although the lessee's duty is not a fiduciary obligation, he
has a duty to perform the contract in good faith, as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of a lessee and
his lessor.1 0 Conceivably drainage facts might be coupled with
clear bad faith and might be gross enough to find a violation
of this duty. However, it is hardly ill treatment of a landowner to drill a highly successful well at a location on a lease
that qualifies the lessor's unleased lands to participate in a
unit which is then promptly formed. This is a landowner's
dream come true.
The only real argument that the landowner might make
to the contrary is that he has paid his share of the well costs
on the leased tract as a part of the consideration for the
granting of the mineral lease. However, absent explicit provisions in the lease, this argument should not prevail in the
face of the clear intent of the Conservation Act for unit costs
to be apportioned on a tract basis.
ROYALTY PAYMENT DELAY
Canik v. Texas InternationalPetroleum Corp." involved
a five month delay between the time production commenced
and the date on which twelve lessors demanded cancellation.
Less than two months expired from the time the Department
of Conservation approved the unit plat until initial royalty
payments were made. Division order work had proceeded in
that interim. Payment was made before demand and unit
participation could not correctly be ascertained until the Department approved the unit plat. The court of appeal denied
cancellation, finding no appreciable time had expired without
justification, even though drilling opinion title work had been
done earlier and even though some of the lessors in the unit
could have been paid earlier. The Louisiana Supreme Court
1 2
denied writs.
The disposition of this case confirms an earlier observation that the courts and the legislature, in viewing the cases
10. LA. R.S. 31:122 (Supp. 1975).
11. 308 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 850 (La.

1975).
12. Id.
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of the past decade, have not seen sufficient lessee abuses to
outweigh the "lying in wait for a killing" image lessors had
acquired. 13 However, the supreme court's qualified language
in its denial of a writ suggests a residual germ of concern for
fair lessee practices which could again flower in proper factual soil, although present Mineral Code requirements of
notice and time to comply make suits of this nature improba4
ble.'
13. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Mineral Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1975).
14. LA. R.S. 31:137-41 (Supp. 1975).

